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PARTIES 
The caption of this case before the Utah Court of Appeals 
reflects the names of those parties to the most recent proceeding 
before the agency whose order is sought to be reviewed. The 
Industrial Commission of Utah has been added as a party-respondent 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 (3) (b) . Pursuant to Rule 
24 (i) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, respondents Sears, 
Roebuck and Company and Industrial Commission of Utah have 
consolidated their response for purposes of this appeal and have 
joined in a single brief. 
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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3. This case involves a review of a 
final order from a formal adjudicative proceeding before a state 
agency. 
Jurisdiction was invoked by means of a Petition for Writ of 
Review filed in compliance with Rule 14 of the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. The Petition for Writ of Review was dated April 4, 
1994, seeking review of the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order 
Denying Motion for Review dated March 10, 1994. The Administrative 
Law Judge's Order of Dismissal was dated June 10, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondents agree with the substance of the issues as 
presented by petitioner. However, respondents disagree with the 
form and implication of petitioner's recitation of the issues. 
Respondents submit the issue in the following form: 
Whether the 180-day limitations period for filing an action 
with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) has expired when 
a charging party withdraws her charge before the UADD voluntarily 
and unequivocally, in order to file suit, and two years later 
requests that the UADD reconsider the same charges? 
This issue involves questions of statutory interpretation. No 
deference is given to the discretion of the Administrative Law 
Judge or the agency. King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P. 2d 1281 (Ct. 
App. Utah 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The interpretation of the following subsections of Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-7.1 are pertinent to the resolution of the issues in 
this appeal: 
(1)(c) A request for agency action made 
under this section shall be filed within 180 
days after the alleged discriminatory or 
prohibitive employment practice occurred. 
* * * 
(11)(a) Either party may file a written 
request for review of the order issued by the 
presiding officer in accordance with Section 
63-46b-12. 
* * * 
(16) The commencement of an action under 
federal law for relief based upon any act 
prohibited by this chapter bars the commence-
ment or continuation of any adjudicative 
proceeding before the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division in connection with the same claims 
under this chapter. Nothing in this subsec-
tion is intended to alter, amend, modify, or 
impair the exclusive remedy provision set 
forth in Subsection (15). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time and 
the judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits and the time limit is 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree with the Statement of the Case as presented 
by Federico, with the following corrections: 
1. Federico states that the civil action in state court was 
dismissed without prejudice to further agency action. (Peti-
tioner's Brief, pp. 3, 4). This implies incorrectly that Judge 
Rigtrup made some finding that further agency action was available. 
The Minute Entry stated only that: "The complaint herein shall be 
dismissed without prejudice to any administrative remedies plain-
tiff may have." (R. 21). The Order of Dismissal, approved as to 
form by Federico's attorney, stated only that the dismissal "be and 
is without prejudice." (R. 22-23). 
2. Federico states that upon dismissal of the state law 
claims, she could not pursue any rights under federal law, either. 
(Petitioner's Brief, p. 3). This implies incorrectly that the 
dismissal of the state action somehow worked an unfair hardship on 
Federico. On the contrary, she arrived at that destination 
strictly because of her own voluntarily decisions and the decisions 
of her counsel. Earlier, she could have continued to pursue her 
claims before the UADD. After demanding and obtaining dismissal of 
the UADD charge, she could have filed suit in federal court as the 
UADD invited her to do. Her state court action alleged only 
violation of state law. She could have alleged Title VII claims in 
that action, which would have survived a motion to dismiss. 
Jurisdiction over Title VII claims is vested in both state and 
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federal courts. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly. 494 U.S. 
820 (1990) . The sole reason that Federico finds herself at this 
late date without recourse under Utah agency procedure or federal 
law, is that she has violated every time limitation pertaining to 
the procedures which otherwise would have provided a forum. 
Federico's state court complaint was properly dismissed 
because it alleged only the claim of wrongful termination in 
retaliation for filing a charge with the UADD. (R. at 16-20) . In 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications. 844 P.2d 949, 962 (Utah 1992), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that the UADD is the exclusive forum 
for a claim of violation of state law by employer retaliation for 
complaints of employment discrimination. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner Jennie Federico7s claim is barred by the 180-day 
limitations period. Federico voluntarily withdrew her complaint 
from the UADD. Her request for the UADD to resume reconsideration 
of her claim some two years later is barred by the limitations 
period. 
Utah's "savings statute" is not applicable. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-40 does not apply to agency actions. § 78-12-40 applies 
only to "new" actions "commenced" within one year from a reversal 
of fortune. Federico's UADD action was dismissed two years prior 
to her request for the UADD to "resume" her action. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONERS CLAIM IS BARRED FOR FAILURE TO FILE 
WITHIN 180 DAYS AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-7.1(C) 
Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-7.1(1)(c) expressly requires that a 
claim for agency action be brought within 180 days of the alleged 
discriminatory event. § 34-35-7.1(1)(c) states: 
A request for agency action made under this 
section shall be filed within 180 days after 
the alleged discriminatory or prohibited 
employment occurred. [emphasis added] 
Federico/ in her original action filed with the UADD, stated 
that the date of the most recent alleged discrimination was April 
18, 1990. (R. at 2). Her later charge, which gives rise to this 
appeal, was on March 4, 1993. (R. at 9). Clearly, more than 180 
days had passed between the alleged discriminatory act(s) and the 
attempted second filing of the action in March, 1993. The attempt 
to file should be barred by the 180-day limitations requirement. 
A statute should be interpreted according to its plain 
meaning. The Court of Appeals set forth the law in OSI Indus. , 
Inc. V.Utah State Tax Comm.. 860 P.2d 381 (Ct. App. Utah 1993): 
When statutory language is plain and unambigu-
ous, we do not look beyond the same to divine 
legislative intent. Rather, we construe a 
statute according to its plain language. 
Specifically/ we will not interpret unambig-
uous language in a statute to contradict its 
plain meaning. Additionally, in interpreting 
unambiguous statutes, we assume that each term 
in the statute was used advisedly; thus the 
statutory words are read literally, unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
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inoperable. Thus, each term should be inter-
preted and applied according to its usually 
accepted meaning, where the ordinary meaning 
of the term results in an application that is 
neither unreasonable, confused, inoperable, 
nor in blatant contradiction of the express 
purpose of the statute. 
Id. at 385 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quotations 
omitted). 
§ 34-35-7.1 presents no unclear or ambiguous terms. The 
statutory language that a request for agency action "shall be 
filed" within 180 days is mandatory language. Federico's argument 
amounts to a request to alter the clear language of the statute. 
Federico cannot support an argument that the limitations 
period was tolled while she pursued her action in state court. She 
voluntarily withdrew her complaint from the UADD. (R. at 3-6) . A 
limitations period is not tolled when a case is dismissed or with-
drawn. "An action dismissed without prejudice leaves the situation 
the same as if the suit had never been brought." See Johnson v. 
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 489 F.2d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1974); 
see also Bomer v. Ribicoff, 304 F.2d 427, 428-29 (6th Cir. 1962). 
If Federico, who initially filed a timely claim with the UADD, 
were able to refile her claim outside the 180 day limitations 
period, then she could presumably bring her claim any time without 
bar, even years from the alleged conduct. Such reasoning would 
result in stale claims and claims that are impossible to investi-
gate due to lapse in time. The Johnson court expressly recognized 
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the danger of permitting a plaintiff to refile a claim without 
consideration of limitation periods: 
Any other holding would result in 
plaintiff's having no time limitation to 
refile in this type of an action after the 
action had been dismissed without prejudice. 
Such latitude for a plaintiff would create 
uncertainty, delay in processing his claim, 
and the possibility of stale claims being 
pursued. 
Id, at 529. See also Kington v. U.S. , 396 F.2d 9, 10 (6th Cir. 
1968) ("No reason is given why she voluntarily dismissed her action 
in the District Court of New Mexico. It is conceded that the 
filing of the prior actions in state and federal courts, which were 
voluntarily dismissed, did not toll the two-year period of limita-
tions in the Act. An action dismissed without prejudice leaves the 
situation the same as if the suit had never been brought.") 
In McClendon v. North American Rockwell Corp.. 2 CCH Emp. 
Prac. Dec, \ 10,243 (CD. Cal. 1970), a plaintiff received a right 
to sue letter on January 15, 1968, and filed an action January 19, 
1968, which was dismissed without prejudice on September 9, 1969. 
On October 29, 1969, fifty days later, the plaintiff filed another 
complaint, identical to the first. The defendant moved for 
dismissal on the ground that the court lacked subject matter juris-
diction since the complaint was not filed within thirty days 
following receipt of the right to sue letter. 
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The McClendon court expressly noted that the effect of a 
voluntary dismissal without prejudice was to create a situation the 
same as though the suit had never been brought. The court stated: 
Even assuming that the jurisdictional time 
period should begin to run anew as of the date 
of voluntary dismissal was entered, such a 
position would be of no benefit to plaintiff 
in this case. Dismissal was ordered on 
September 9, 1969. Suit, however, was brought 
on October 29, some fifty days later. Thus 
even if the Section 706(e) time period of 
thirty days was tolled by the first suit, 
plaintiff7s new suit would still be jurisdic-
tionally defective. 
Id. at 974. 
The Johnson court acknowledged the McClendon decision. It 
stated: 
Although Bomer and McCLendon are authority 
for the proposition that the filing of a suit 
which was dismissed without prejudice did not 
toll the thirty-day filing requirement of 
Title VII, the District Court was of the view 
that the complaint should have been refiled 
within thirty days after such dismissal. But, 
even extending the time an additional thirty 
days, the new suit was still jurisdictionally 
defective because it was not filed within that 
time. 
We are of the opinion that the District 
Court was clearly correct in holding that at a 
minimum Johnson had to file the new case 
within thirty days from the date of dismissal 
without prejudice. 
Johnson, 489 F.2d at 529. 
When Federico received her "Letter of Right to Sue" from the 
EEOC she had 90 days to institute an action. (R. 7, 7A) . Under 
the holding of Johnson and McClendon, even if Federico were granted 
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an additional 90 days to file suit in another forum after the state 
court dismissal, she failed to take such action. She chose, five 
months after the district court dismissal, and two years after her 
voluntary dismissal of her UADD claim, to request that the UADD 
reconsider her claim. 
Federico cites Simmons v. Mountain Bell. 806 P.2d 6 (Mont. 
1990) for authority that her claim is not barred by 180-day limita-
tions period. Simmons did not involve the voluntary dismissal of 
the plaintiff's charges with the state agency. Simmons involved a 
charging party, who as a result of charges filed, was allegedly 
retaliated against. The charging party then sought to amend her 
original complaint to include charges of retaliation. The charging 
party sought to amend her charges because of alleged new torts 
committed against her. Federico has not sought to amend any 
complaint. Federico withdrew her charges with the UADD. She now 
seeks to have her same old charges renewed. Federico's request is 
not based on any alleged new claim. Simmons provides no helpful 
insight to the resolution of this matter. 
If Federico is permitted to resume her original action with 
the UADD, UADD and Sears will both suffer prejudice and hardship. 
The UADD will never be able to close a file. Under Federico's 
argument, so long as she filed the initial claim within 180 days of 
the alleged tort, she could then resume that claim any time in the 
future. This will result in claims which are stale and impossible 
for the UADD to administer. 
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Sears will be forced to defend itself once again in an action 
before the UADD. Sears has already defended itself once before the 
UADD, and once in state court. Sears should not be subjected to 
Federico's forum shopping tactics. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY WITHDREW HER CAUSE OF 
ACTION FROM THE UADD AND SHOULD BE ESTOPPED 
FROM REFILING HER CLAIM WITH THE UADD. 
Federico herself withdrew her charge and embarked on an 
alternative procedure. She has no ground to invoke any equitable 
consideration for her position. 
Pursuant to a request from Federico, her administrative action 
with the UADD was voluntarily withdrawn on March 21, 1991. (See 
Petitionees Brief, p.4, f5 4-5). Federico expressly stated by 
letter and waiver that she no longer desired that the UADD pursue 
her action. In an undated letter, Federico stated: 
Please be informed that my intentions are to 
file this action in Federal District Court, 
and therefore, request that EEOC and the UADD 
cease any further investigative findings and 
that EEOC issue a Notice of Right to Sue. 
(R. at 3) (emphasis added). 
In a handwritten letter, dated March 4, 1991, Federico states: 
I am requesting a right to sue letter from 
you. I no longer wish you to work on my case. 
Could you please send me any and all letters 
that I have giv[en] to you concerning my case 
with the Industrial Commission. 
10 
I would also like to thank-you for the time 
and effort. 
(R. at 4) (emphasis added). 
In a signed waiver, Federico states that she requested "the 
withdrawal of my charge because I have exhausted the administrative 
remedies and intend to file in federal court." (R. at 5A) . 
Federico also received a letter from John A. Medina, Director of 
the UADD, expressly notifying Federico that the UADD would no 
longer pursue her claim: 
This letter is to inform you that your 
complaint is being closed, effective the date 
shown above, for the following reason: 
You have asked the State of Utah to discon-
tinue its administrative process and are 
requesting EEOC to provide you a Notice of 
Right to Sue. 
Further, you have indicated that you do not 
wish to proceed and you have signed withdrawal 
forms in this matter. No further action will 
be taken by us on this complaint. 
If you have any questions regarding this 
decision, feel free to contact this office. 
(R. at 6) (emphasis added). 
Federico could not have made her intentions more clear. Now 
having received the agency dismissal she unequivocally demanded, 
she asks the Court of Appeals to hold that she may revive the 
dismissed claim. 
The express words of correspondence between Federico and the 
UADD clearly placed Federico on notice that she would no longer be 
able to pursue an action with the UADD. Federico did not contact 
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the UADD office with any questions. She did not contact the UADD 
until March 4, 1993, two years later, when she sought the UADD's 
reconsideration of her action. 
Federico argues that she "was not clearly informed beforehand 
that the Commission would take such a rigid posture." (Peti-
tionees Brief, p. 12). The language of the letter from the UADD 
is clear and unequivocal. Federico's own correspondence with the 
UADD evidences that Federico knew her claim would not again be 
processed by the UADD. 
Federico also argues that the UADD must reconsider her claim 
because she was "unrepresented" and not informed that her rights 
with the UADD would be "forever and unalterably forfeited". (See 
Petitionees Brief, p. 12) . Federico cites no authority to support 
her argument that alleged lack of counsel and understanding caused 
her to think that she could refile with the UADD. 
Federico's written communication indicating her desire to file 
in Federal Court shows that she was not lacking understanding. 
Notwithstanding her apparent knowledge, the law in Utah holds pro 
se claimants to the same standard as members of the bar. 
Generally, a person who represents him-or-
herself will be held to the same standard of 
knowledge and practice as any qualified member 
of the bar. 
Wurst v. Dept. of Empl. Sec, 818 P.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (Ct. App. 
Utah 1991); see also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 
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1983) • The petitioner in Wurst had represented herself in 
proceedings with the Industrial Commission. 
In any event, shortly afterward Federico had counsel who filed 
the state court action on her behalf. 
The correspondence between Federico and the UADD, the express 
language of the waiver, and Utah case law defeat Federico's claim 
of lack of understanding and bar her refiling of her claim with the 
UADD. 
Federico,s argument to have the UADD reconsider her original 
claim is barred by estoppel. 
The elements necessary to invoke equitable 
estoppel are: 
(1) A statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) reason-
able action or inaction by the other party 
taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act; and (3) injury to the second party 
that would result from allowing the first 
party to contradict or repudiate such 
statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act. 
Orton v. Utah State Tax Comm. , 864 P.2d 904, 909 (Ct. App. Utah 
1993) . 
Federico requested that the UADD "no longer work on her case" 
so that she could pursue an action in "Federal District Court." 
(R. at 3-4). Federico stated that she had "exhausted the admin-
istrative remedies" available to her. (R. at 5(b)). Federico has 
now altered her position and sought to have the UADD reconsider her 
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original claim. The UADD did not further pursue investigation of 
this claim because of its reliance on Federico's withdrawal of her 
claim. Although Sears conducted some discovery pursuant to 
Federico's state court complaint, Sears, recognizing the state 
court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, did not conduct the 
extensive investigation and discovery that it would have conducted 
had the action remained open at the UADD. 
The UADD, if forced to reconsider this claim, would suffer 
injury because it will be forced never to close a file that has 
been voluntarily closed by any claimant. The UADD would have to 
keep all charges voluntarily withdrawn in a "quasi-active11 status, 
permitting charging parties the right to re-open their claim at any 
time in the future. The limitations period would thus be rendered 
meaningless. 
Federico's actions evidence an express intent on her part to 
have the UADD dismiss her charges against Sears. She has shown no 
evidence to support her argument that she was lacking in knowledge. 
She is estopped from refiling her same charges against Sears some 
two years later. 
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POINT III 
FEDERICO DOES NOT BENEFIT FROM THE SAVING 
STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-40. 
Federico first filed a claim with the UADD. She then withdrew 
that claim and filed an action in state district court. She then 
sought to have the UADD resume her claim after the district court 
dismissed her claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Federico argues that if the original UADD discontinuance of 
her claim as a result of her own request, is "deemed a dismissal, 
and the request to resume such action deemed a refiling, then that 
request has indeed been timely made, based on Section 78-12-40 of 
the Utah Code." (Petitioner's Brief, p. 13). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 states: 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal of fortune. 
Federico fails to support her argument that her request to the 
UADD to reconsider her claim was timely, even if § 78-12-40 
applies. The voluntary dismissal of the UADD claims was in March, 
1991. The request to have the UADD reconsider the claim was in 
March, 1993, two years later. Even if the Utah saving statute were 
applied to UADD claims, the statute would allow a grace period of 
one year from the first dismissal. Even under the most liberal 
15 
interpretation of the saving statute, it would not extend to the 
March, 1993, request to reconsider. 
In any event, the saving statute applies to civil actions, and 
not to agency claims. The express language of the statute is that 
a party may "commence a new action" within one year from the 
"reversal of fortune." Federico did not "commence a new action" 
with the UADD. Federico sought the UADD to "resume consideration 
of her charges". 
The word "commenced" is defined in Utah Rule 
of Civil Procedure 3(a), which states, "A 
civil action is commenced (1) by filing a 
complaint with the court, or (2) by the 
service of a summons." Because Muir had filed 
a complaint with the court, she commenced her 
action and therefore may take advantage of the 
saving statute. 
Baumaart v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 645, 647 (Ct. App. 
Utah 1993) . 
In Utah, suits are commenced by the filing of 
a complaint or the service of a summons, not 
by the filing of a notice of claim, which is 
more properly classified as a precondition to 
suit than as the means of commencing a suit. 
Madsen v. Brothick, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988). 
Federico did not attempt to or commence an action with the 
UADD in March 1993. Requesting investigation by the UADD is not 
equivalent to filing a "complaint with the court" or serving a 
summons. 
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CONCLUSION 
The request to reopen the charge in March, 1993, is far beyond 
the 180-day mandate within which to file charges. Federico's 
original charges filed with the UADD were dismissed at her own 
request, and thereafter, she could have taken advantage of the 
right to pursue her claim of violation of federal law, but did not 
do so. There are no circumstances in this case which would require 
this court to relieve Federico of the effect of the limitation for 
filing charges with the UADD. 
Dated this 2-5 day of August, 1994. 
STRONG & HANNI^O 
( Roger H>-^ttllock 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Sears, Roebuck and Company 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Alan L. Hennebold 
General Counsel 
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